فلسفهء آزادی ازنگاه رودلف اشتاینر

The philosophy of freedom
Science of freedom
I.
THE CONSCIOUS HUMAN ACTION


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Is a mentally-free being man in his thinking and acting or is he under the Zwange of a purely naturgesetzlichen ehernen necessity? A few questions as much insight is been contacted as on them. The idea of freedom of human will found warm trailer as persistent opponents in richer number. There are people who declare each for a limited spirit in their moral pathos, which is able to deny a so obvious fact as freedom. Others are facing you to see the Summit of the Unwissenschaftlichkeit if someone believes broken the law of nature on the areas of human action and thinking. The same thing will here often for the kostbarste estate of humanity as explained for the ärgste illusion. Infinite quirk spent to explain human freedom with the work in nature, but also the man belongs tolerates. The trouble with from other page understand making wanted, how such Wahnidee has can arise is not less. Here having it with one of the most important issues of life, religion, to do the practice and science, which feels anyone who has not the opposite of thoroughness of hervorstechendste train of its character. And it belongs to the sad characters of superficiality current thinking that a book that characterize a "new faith» from the results of newer Naturforschung wants (David Friedrich Strauss, the old and the new faith), on this issue

15

Nothing contains the words: «On the question of the freedom of human will we have hiebei not engage us.» «Supposedly indifferent choice was detected by each philosophy that was worth the name as a blank phantom; the moral scoring of human acts and Gesinnungen but remains unaffected by those question. Not because I believe that the book it is has a special meaning, I am at this point here, but because she express the opinion seems until the in the relevant matter most of our thinking contemporaries aufzuschwingen capable itself. That the freedom could fail to choose one or the other of two possible actions quite discretion seems to know anyone making claim it to be outgrown the wissenschaftlichenKinderschuhen today. It is always, so you a very specific reason claims exist, why one of several possible actions certain just one execution brings.

This seems obvious. Nevertheless the main attacks of freedom opponents affecting this day only freedom of choice. But Herbert Spencer, who lives in views says the gaining distribution with jedemTage (the principles of psychology of Herbert Spencer, German edition of Dr. B. cousin, Stuttgart 1882): «that but everyone at will desire or not desire could, what is the actual set exposed in the dogma of the free will that is of course information analysis of consciousness denies than by the contents of previous chapters (psychology).» From same considerations others assume when they the

16

Combat concept of free will. The micro-organisms provides all relevant comments on Spinoza. Were put what clearly and simply forward this against the idea of freedom, which has been repeated since countless times, only wrapped mostly in the spitzfindigsten theoretical lessons, making it difficult, the finishing reasoning it arrives on the alone to detect. Spinoza writes in a letters from October or November 1674: "I call free things namely, composed of the mere need of nature and is, and I call that is determined by anything else to the existence and effect in accurate and integral way forced. So for example God exists although necessary, but free, because it consists only of the need for its nature alone. As God detects themselves and all others freely because following its nature alone is the necessity, recognize everything. «So you see, I have freedom in a free need instead of a free vote.»

"But we want to see the created things which all of express causes certainly are, solid and accurate way to survive and to work." To see this more clearly we want to imagine one very simple thing. To a certain amount of movement with which he afterwards if the shock which express reason has ceased, necessary continues to move receives an outer, stoßenden him cause for example a stone. This insistence of stone in its movement is therefore a forced and not necessary because it express one through the cause must be defined. What is here from the stone applies from any other single thing and she prefers so composed and

17

"too much be suitable, namely that each case comment on necessary from a cause determines is solid and accurate way to survive and to work."

"Take now, I ask that the stone thinks as he moves and know he bestrebe is so he can continue in the move. This stone is aware his ambition and not indifferent acts, believe that it is completely free and that it continue ride for any other reason in his motion, as because he wanted it. This is but those human freedom which claim to have all and only is that people of their desire are aware but don't know the causes of which they are determined. The child free begehre the milk and the zornige boy that he freely ask the revenge, and the Furchtsame believes the flight. Also the drunken believes that he speak this after free decision, what he, when he had; become sober, like not spoken and because this prejudice is everyone inborn, can you get not easily thereof. "When enough teaches the experience that the people at least moderate their desire can and that she opposite passions moves, the better view and do the worse, so they adhere but for free, because they less desire things and many desire easily by the memory of another which you often entsinnt can be suspended."

Because here there is a clear and determined laid down view, it is also easy uncover the Grundirrtum which is therein. As necessary as the stone on a push a certain movement running, just not

18

Agile man to perform an act if he is driven by any reason. Just because man has an awareness of his action, he believe for the free Veranlasser of thereof. He übersehe but that a cause pushes him he must necessarily follow. The mistake in this Gedankengange is soon found. Spinoza and those who think like him, overlooked that man by his act has not only awareness but also from the causes can have it, it is routed. Nobody will deny that the child is non-free if it desires the milk that the drunken is when he says things he later regretted. Both know the sources involved in the depths of organism and they are in their irresistible Zwange. But it is entitled to cast acts of such lumped with those where man of not only his action is aware, but also the reasons which make it? Are the actions of people indifferent art? May give of the warrior on the Schlachtfelde which the scientific researcher in the laboratory be provided the leader in knotty diplomatic affairs scientifically on equal footing with the children's, if it desires to milk? It is probably true that it da best attempts a task solution where the matter is the easiest. But often the lack of discernment brought endless confusion. And a profound difference is whether I know why I do something, or whether it does not yet. First this seems to be a quite self-evident truth. And yet by the opponents of freedom never then asked

19

whether because a reason of my action, I recognize and durchschaue, means a compulsion for me in same meaning as the organic process that makes the baby cry for milk.

Eduard von Hartmann claims in his "phenomenology of moral consciousness» (5. 451) the human will slopes from two main factors: the reasons and the character. Considering all people equal or to their wool seems intended but their diversity as a matter of outside, namely by the circumstances which herantreten to them. But considering that different people until make an idea to draw of its action when its nature is such that prompted by the appropriate presentation to a Begehrung man inside appears determined and not from the outside. Man believes now, because he only must make one him according to his character from outside aufgedrängte idea the reason: he was free, i.e. independent of external motives. Is the truth but after Eduard von Hartmann, that: "If but we only collect the ideas to motives, so we do but not arbitrarily but after need our charakterologischen investment so nothing less than free. Here remains the difference all regardless, which exists between reasons I Act only put on me after I have penetrated it with my consciousness, and those which I follow, without I have a clear knowledge of them.

And this leads directly to the position from which the matter should here be considered. Shall

20

Question for freedom our will ever unilaterally for themselves? And if not: which others must she be linked to necessary?

Is a difference between a conscious reason of my action and an unconscious drive then the former will drag an act itself, which must be assessed differently as such from blind-drange. Ask this difference will be the first. And what results they thereof will depend only on, have to ask ourselves how we for the actual point of freedom.

What is a knowledge of the reasons for its action have? It has too little considered this question because it has torn unfortunately in two parts what is an inseparable whole: the people. One difference the actors and the discerning and blank assumed only of the matters above all other is this: agent from knowledge.

It says: man is free if he is his reason only under the rule and not under the animalistic desires. Or also: freedom meant to determine his life and action after purposes and Entschlüssen.

With allegations such nothing is won but. Because that is indeed precisely the question whether the reason, whether purposes and conclusions equally to humans have a compulsion as animalische desires. Without my intervention a sensible decision in me emerges with same need such as hunger and thirst, then I may follow him only Perforce and my freedom is an illusion.

21

Is a different phrase: free awareness is not want can what you want, but can do what you want. The poet philosopher Robert Hamerling has marked this idea in its "Atomistik of will» in sharp outlined words:" man can do, however, what he wants - but he can not want what he wants because his will by motives is intended. -He can not do what he wants? One look at these words but more detail. Is a reasonable sense? Freedom of aspiration should therefore consist that one, could want something without reason without subject? But what is different than have a reason prefer to do so or desirable as that wool because? Something want would mean without reason, somewhat want without subject without want it. The subject has unzertrennlich associated terms of aspiration. Without a voyage subject the will is a blank Fortune: only by the scene he is acting and real. It is therefore quite right that the human will is therefore as his direction always by the strongest from images is intended. "But on the other hand, it must be admitted that it is absurd to speak which previously were to want, what you do not want this towards a possible of will. (Atomistik of will 2) Volume 5. 213 f.)

Again spoken only by motives in General, without taking the difference between unconscious and conscious consideration. If a scene has on me and I am forced to follow him because it proves the "strongest» under reasserted, then the idea of freedom cease to have meaningful. How should it a meaning have for me, whether I can do something

22

or not, I will require from the motives to do it? Not that it comes about first: whether I can or not do something if the scene has wrought on me, but whether there are such motives that act with compelling necessity. If I must want something is highly indifferent whether I can do it I may. If me because my character and because of the circumstances prevailing near me imposed a scene, the sichmeinemDenken is against unreasonable, then I should be even pleased when I could not what I want.

It is not out of I can bring a verbal decision to run but arises as the decision in me.

What distinguishes the people from all other organic beings, rests on his rational thinking. To, he shares with other organisms. Nothing is thus won when it searches analogies in the animal rich to bleaching of Freiheitsbegriffes for the actions of people. The modern science loves such analogies. And if succeeded it, animals have found something the human behavior similar she believe to have affected the most important issue of science of the human. This view leads to what misunderstandings, shows in the beech: «The illusion of FREEWILL» by p. REE, 1885, the freedom following says (5. 5) about: "that it seems to us as if the motion of stone necessary of donkey will were unnecessary, is easily erklärlich. The causes which move the stone are Yes outside and visible. The causes but vermöge which the donkey

23

will, are inside and invisible: the braincase of donkey is between us and place of their effectiveness. It does not see the causal Conditionedness and therefore thinks it is not present. «The wool explains, was the cause of the revolution (the donkey), but unless absolutely; it was an absolute beginning.» So again explains about acts of people where he has an awareness of the reasons for its action, simply passed because REE: «Between us and place of their effectiveness of donkey braincase located.» That, although not acts of Donkey but there such people, between us and the Act the subject has become aware lies, it has to close, after these words REE no idea. He proves some pages also later by the words: "we do not perceive the causes, depends upon which our goals, therefore we think it is absolutely not ursachlich conditional.

But enough of examples which prove that many against freedom fight without knowing what is freedom at all.

That an act can be restricted, which the perpetrators not know why he executeth it is quite obvious. What about but with such, knew of their reasons? This leads us to the question: what is the origin and the importance of thinking? Because without the knowledge of thinking control the soul a notion of knowledge of something, also an act is not possible. If we see what means thinking in General, then it will be easy to clear about are what a role the Den-

24

Ken plays in human action. «Thinking makes the soul which the animal is talented, only to the spirit», Hegel says with law and therefore thinking will be his eigentümliches character to the human action.

Far from claims that all our actions only from the sober reflection of our mind fließe. Only those acts as hinzustellen human in the highest sense resulting from the abstract judgment is quite remote me. But once from areas satisfy purely animal desires are our actions promote erhebt our motives from thoughts are interspersed. Love, compassion, patriotism are Triebfedern of action, which dissolve into cold common sense terms. They say: the heart, the mood occur because in their rights. Without a doubt. But the heart and the mood do not the motives of action. They require same and put them on their area. Makes up the compassion in my heart if someone mitleiderregenden idea occurred in my consciousness. The way to the heart goes through your head. Of the love is no exception. If it is not the mere statement of Geschlechtstriebes, it is based on the ideas we make of the beloved community. And these ideas are idealistic, love is the beseligender. Again, the idea is the father of Gefühles. They say: love do blind for the weaknesses of the beloved being. The matter can be handled also vice versa and claims: love open eye just for its benefits. Many go ahnungslos of these

25

Benefits past without realising it. One sees it and just so love awakened in his soul. What he did different: as from which an idea embraced, which hundred others have none. You do not have the love because lack the the idea.

We may handle the matter as we want: increasingly clear it must be, that the issue requires the others after the essence of human action after the origins of thought. First, I turn to this issue.